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Operation "Spring" 
An Historian's View 
Terry Copp 
Brian McKenna, the author of the infamous Valour and the Horror television series, is 
determined to sell his story of the Black Watch 
at Verrieres Ridge to anyone who will buy it. His 
recent article in Macleans echoes previous 
attempts to convince readers that "Canada's 
military establishment, abetted by its official 
historians.. .lied to protect reputations and keep 
smooth careers." McKenna is equally critical of 
non-official professional historians who have 
studied the battle. He believes that he is the only 
one who has the knowledge and insight to 
interpret what happened that day. Why is 
McKenna so committed to his mythic version of 
events? Part of it is wounded pride over the 
negative reaction to his television series but 
McKenna is an idealist not a cynic and he 
genuinely believes that Major Phillip Griffin 
deserves a Victoria Cross for his actions on 25 
July 1944. 
If McKenna would take the trouble to make 
his argument from evidence and avoid personal 
attacks he might make a contribution to our 
understanding of the battle and the way in which 
awards for valour are made. Instead he 
constructs a story out of half-truths and 
hyperbole. McKenna is not alone in his 
passionate defence of Griffin. The Black Watch 
Veterans Association has always nurtured a 
regimental memory which assigns blame to the 
generals. When the exact wording for the 2001 
memorial plaque for the Canadian Battle of 
Normandy Foundation site at Point 67 in 
Normandy was under discussion veterans 
insisted that Griffin had been ordered to advance 
directly over the ridge. 
Let us assume the question of responsibility 
is still open and examine Brian McKenna's 
version of events. McKenna begins with the 
statement that the entire Canadian Corps, some 
30,000 men, were involved in an offensive that 
has "echoes of Vimy Ridge." Operation "Spring" 
was a limited, carefully phased attack with three 
battalions, less that 1,200 combat troops, 
advancing in the first phase and three more 
battalions, including the Black Watch, carrying 
out a second phase to secure villages on the 
reverse slope of the ridge. The second phase 
attacks, planned for first light, were to be directly 
supported by Canadian armour while two 
regiments of the 7th Armoured Division 
attempted to advance across the centre of the 
ridge. All of this is clearly laid out in the plans 
for "Spring" and the message logs demonstrate 
that the armoured regiments did their best to 
assist the infantry in Phase 2. They were 
unsuccessful and suffered heavy losses but 
McKenna will not even admit they were involved. 
According to McKenna, Lieutenant-General 
Guy Simonds, commander of 2nd Canadian 
Corps, who was "awkward at deploying tanks 
and infantry," held back "the masses of tanks" 
he commanded and decreed that "the Black 
Watch and 17 other infantry regiments must lead 
the breakout." 
The Black Watch, McKenna tells us, were 
given "a particularly daunting task. The regiment 
must scale the ridge and capture the strategic 
hamlet of Fontenay-le-Marmion." How exactly 
anyone would "scale" the gentle slope of the ridge 
which rises just 37 metres over a distance of 
1,000 metres is not clear but the original plan 
called for the Black Watch to avoid the slope and 
attack from a start line on the outskirts of May-
sur-Orne. 
McKenna's penchant for exaggeration 
reaches absurdity in his description of the 
enemy. The ridge, which in the television series 
was held by the 12th SS Hitler Youth Division, 
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Major Philip Griffin 
is now defended by "four of Hitler's elite SS 
Panzer Divisions." The part of the ridge attacked 
by the North Novas and Royal Hamilton Light 
Infantry was held by 1 SS Panzer Division but 
the enemy facing the Black Watch was the 272nd 
Infantry Division. Panzer battlegroups were in 
reserve to counterattack, but Simonds' intention 
was to have his battalions on the their objectives 
and dug-in before such at tacks could be 
mounted. 
The dramatization of events presented in the 
Valour and the Horror showed German soldiers 
racing through concrete-lined tunnels to do 
battle with the Canadians . McKenna the 
journalist knew the mine tunnels under the ridge 
did not remotely resemble what he pictured on 
television but to a film-maker a picture can be 
worth a thousand words whether it is true or 
false. McKenna now tells us that in St. Martin 
the Black Watch were "hit from every 
direction...the Germans are infiltrating from a 
labyrinth of mining tunnels under the ridge." 
The Black Watch casualties in St. Martin 
occurred when a single machine gun, bypassed 
by the Calgary Highlanders in their night advance 
to May-sur-Orne, killed Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stuart Cantlie, the Black Watch commanding 
officer, and wounded his most experienced 
senior officer. This had nothing to do with the 
tunnels which were not used for infiltration or 
anything else. Though they do make a hell of a 
good story. 
The best evidence for what happened next 
is from an interview with Major Edwin Bennett 
conducted by an historical officer on 1 August 
1944. Bennett, who was himself killed-in-action 
shortly afterward, reported: 
Major Griffin's problem was that the battalion 
was rather extended. The companies were intact 
and under good control bu t the threat of 
dispersion and of possible confusion was near. 
Light was breaking and we were under fire from 
the ridge. We had jus t made contact with the 
tanks in St. Andre-sur-Orne. They had moved 
into the orchard as a harbour and had lost two 
tanks coming through the town. Furthermore it 
was getting close to H hour for the attack and 
the battalion was far from the start line. Soon 
the artillery fire would begin and would be of no 
value. Major Griffin had to make time to liaise 
with the artillery and, if possible, retime their 
shoot. He had to get the tank commander into 
the picture and make use of his force in any 
new plans. Before this could be done, he had to 
find out the situation in St. Andre-sur-Orne from 
die Camerons of Canada and obtain what reports 
he could on the Calgaries and the situation at 
May-sur-Orne. 
Major Griffin is a brilliant officer of absolutely 
outstanding courage and ability. His take-over 
in this strained and ticklish situation was 
superb. There was no uncertainty whatever in 
his actions. He foresaw only a delay, which would 
at die outside be two hours, while he rearranged 
timings and obtained essential information. The 
plan for the attack would be the same as had 
been previously set. In the meantime the 
battalion was to move to St. Andre-sur-Orne and 
occupy the X rds there on Verrieres rd so that 
the men would be less obvious targets for the 
fire from the left flank and so that a firm base 
for ops would be available. So complete was his 
control and so well trained the battalion that 
this was done at once and in incredibly good 
order. All the companies were in their new 
positions within 20 minutes of the conclusion 
of the "O" Group. Up to this time our casualties, 
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aside from the three serious losses in leadership, 
were slight, a m o u n t i n g to ten or fifteen 
altogether.' 
McKenna might have used Bennet t ' s 
interview, which makes no reference to any 
change in the approach to the start line, as 
evidence that the direct advance was the result 
of new orders from on high. Instead he relies on 
later recollections and suggests that Griffin only 
agreed to any attack because "the honour of the 
regiment was at stake." 
The contemporary evidence suggests a very 
different picture, one that I outline in my 1992 
book The Brigade Griffin's actions between 0600 
hours and 0930 hours when the Black Watch 
attack began, cannot be fully reconstructed. 
What is known is that a new artillery fire plan 
was agreed upon and tank support arranged with 
Major Walter Harris, the commander of "B" 
Squadron the First Hussars.2 The artillery plan 
was simply a repetition of the original scheme 
to lead the battalion from May to Fontenay but 
Griffin decided to move directly to the start line 
on a compass bearing rather than by the road 
to May. He now wanted the tanks to protect his 
right flank rather than the left as in the original 
plan, hoping that the advance of the 7 th 
Armoured Division would fully occupy the enemy 
to the east. At about 0830 hours Griffin made 
contact with Lieutenant Michon, commanding 
"D" Company of the Calgaries and asked him to 
"clear out the factory area." Michon "went 
forward to recce to discover very heavy machine-
gun fire coming from the factory area on the right 
and from the knocked out tanks on the high 
ground on our left." Michon told Griffin that, 
"this was too strong opposition for one company 
to clear without artillery support or smoke. He 
then asked me to go forward to see if the Start 
Line was secure and to send him word as he 
had no information concerning our forward 
companies."3 The Black Watch start line was a 
road angling out of May-sur-Orne and Michon 
would not agree to recce it for Griffin. He was 
unable to contact the other Calgary companies 
and when he reported to battalion headquarters 
Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. MacLaughlan, the 
battalion commander, ordered him to "try and 
get forward to the objective." Captain Harrison 
and the missing part of "D" Company had arrived 
but their attempt to "get forward" to May was 
This photo shows the gentle slope of Verrieres Ridge, visible in the distance past the town of St. Martin-de-Fontenay. 
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stopped by an intense mor tar barrage which 
caused "very heavy casualties."4 
Griffin had sent a patrol consisting of his 
intelligence officer, Lieutenant L.R. Duffield, 
Sergeant Benson and one scout to May-sur-Orne. 
The patrol moved straight down route 162 
"without using the ditches"5 and walked into the 
centre of May-sur-Orne without seeing or hearing 
any Germans or Calgary Highlanders. At the 
crossroads in the centre of the village they turned 
left towards the road which marked the battalion 
start line. Fifty yards before reaching it they were 
fired on by a machine-gun and Duffield returned 
to tell Griffin that the Calgaries were not in May 
and that the machine-gun would be able to fire 
into the flank of the battalion. Griffin's response 
was to order Duffield to lead a reinforced patrol, 
six men, back to May to "take out" the machine-
gun.6 
Duffield's patrol was not the only force to 
visit May-sur-Orne that morning. Major Walter 
Harr i s , commanding the Firs t H u s s a r s 
squadron, had listened to divisional and brigade 
orders "to go ahead" with Phase II and had sent 
one of his four troops forward. This troop 
"located some of the Calgary Highlanders in a 
hollow north of May, badly cut up and in need of 
stretcher bearers, ammunition, etc." Leaving two 
tanks to assist the Calgaries, the troop proceeded 
to feel its way cautiously into the village. At the 
main crossroads the lead tank was holed by an 
anti-tank gun and the remaining tank withdrew 
to a hull-down position on the north edge of the 
village.7 
Meanwhile Major Griffin was conferring with 
Brigadier W.J. Megill, commander of 5 Brigade, 
who had learned through the gunner radio net 
that a fire plan, timed for 0930 hours, had been 
requested by the Black Watch. Megill recalls that 
Griffin was on the verandah of a building on the 
forward edge of St. Martin looking outwards 
towards May. There did not seem to be any 
shelling at that time and Major Griffin calmly 
explained his plan. Megill thought it looked like 
"a dicey proposition" and suggested that the 
Black Watch secure May-sur-Orne first. 
According to Megill, Griffin replied that they had 
"patrols in May" and he doubted that it was held 
on "a continuous basis." Griffin felt sure that if 
the Black Watch attack went in, then once it had 
passed its start line the Calgary Highlanders 
could "fill in behind, on into May-sur-Orne." 
Megill accepted this assessment and returned 
to his headquarters.8 
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The Black Watch had to move quickly if its 
lead companies were to take full advantage of 
the timed artillery program. Unfortunately the 
Hussars were delayed owing to the narrowness 
of the sunken approach road and when the first 
tanks arrived at the forming-up place the Black 
Watch had already begun to move forward. The 
Hussars could still see the infantry moving in 
single file with the men close together 9 and the 
tanks quickly started across the open ground, 
aiming for the gap between May and the ridge 
east of the village. Accurate, large-calibre, anti-
tank fire struck the lead tanks immediately and 
the others sought dead ground. By 1020 hours 
six tanks had been lost and Major Harris 
wounded. At least one troop reported reaching 
the start line but their tanks were then caught 
in enfilade fire from the eastern edge of May.10 
The infantry moved in single file, with the 
men close together, until they emerged from the 
houses and hedgerows of St. Martin. Lieutenant 
W.B. Wood, who was wounded by machine-gun 
fire before the company started up the hill, 
suggests that the men would have been well-
spaced out as they moved forward through the 
tall grain.'' Three hundred men, spread-out over 
a wide area, had little sense of what was 
happening around them and the battalion did 
not falter. Griffin's plan assumed that the Black 
Watch would be able to reach the start-line as 
the artillery barrage began. Instead the battalion 
was subjected to heavy mortar and machine-gun 
fire as it advanced to its start line. When the 
survivors reached the crest of the hill the barrage 
had passed and the enemy was able to react 
quickly. 
C a p t a i n J o h n Tay lo r d e s c r i b e d t h e a d v a n c e 
in a l e t t e r t o h i s f a t h e r d a t e d 15 A u g u s t 1 9 4 4 : 
To begin with I might say that you never need be 
ashamed of having belonged to the Black Watch. 
We started across country at 0900 hours. By then 
the Jerries were thoroughly awake as to what 
was going on and from the start we had trouble 
from very heavy machine-gunning from the 
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flanks, mortars and artillery fire. The troops 
were steady as a rock and we kept going. I was 
the left forward company and on my right was B 
company, then commanded by Sergeant Foam, 
all the officers having been knocked out. We 
overran two strong points, then I got hit so I 
can't be accurate as to the rest of the story but I 
understand they got the objective.12 
Taylor was wounded before Griffin and 
approximately 60 men crossed the crest of the 
ridge. One survivor, Private Montreuil, reported 
that Captain John Kemp, commanding "D" 
Company, urged Major Griffin to call off the 
attack but Griffin replied "that the orders were 
to attack and that the battalion would therefore 
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The mine tower in the "factory" area is visible in this photo taken from the north edge of May-sur-Orne looking north. The 
high ground in the background is Point 67. The low, square tower on the right is the church in St. Martin-de-Fontenay. 
This photo was taken in 1946. 
carry on."13 On top of the ridge the remnant of 
the battalion "ran directly into a strong and 
exceptionally well camouflaged enemy 
position."14 Tanks and self-propelled guns were 
concealed in haystacks and intense close-range 
fire forced the men to ground. Griffin, who may 
have been the only officer left, ordered a 
withdrawal - "every man to make his way back 
as best he could." Not more than 15 soldiers 
were able to do so. Griffin's body was later found 
"lying among those of his men."15 
The Black Watch suffered 307 casualties on 
25 July. Five officers and 118 other ranks were 
killed or died of wounds, 101 were wounded and 
of the 83 taken prisoner, 21 were wounded. As 
the official historian noted, "Except for the 
Dieppe operation there is no other instance in 
the Second World War when a Canadian battalion 
had so many casualties in a single day."16 
The battle did not end with the destruction 
of the Black Watch. The brigade message log 
portrays a scene of confused fighting on the 
northern edge of May lasting into the early 
afternoon. At 1615 hours a smokescreen was 
laid across the front and Brigadier Megill 
ordered the Calgaries to withdraw into St. Andre. 
Many of the wounded had to be left behind in 
the fields to the south and east of St. Martin. 
Lieutenant Leo Dallain, Royal Canadian Army 
Medical Corps, went forward into this area 
despite mortar and small arms fire. He located 
many of the casualties, "organized them into 
nests and returned with stretcher-bearers to 
evacuate them." The next day, 26 July, heavy 
German pressure led the evacuation of all of St. 
Martin and Dallain was ordered to cease 
attempts to locate further casualties. He was 
awarded the Military Cross for this extraordinary 
effort.17 
Can anyone seriously argue that Griffin 
should have received a Victoria Cross for leading 
his men forward after it was evident that the 
enemy held the ridge in strength? Griffin was 
young, brave and inexperienced. On the basis 
and the information available to him in the early 
hours of 25 July he made, or agreed to, a 
decision to carry out an ill-considered attack. 
Griffin and Megill ought to have stuck to the 
original plan, and established a firm base in May-
sur -Orne before mounting any attack on 
Fontenay. If the Watch had helped the Calgaries 
and consolidated in May-sur-Orne, Operation 
"Spring" would be remembered as a significant 
victory and Griffin would have been a near-
certainty for a DSO but that is not what 
happened. 
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McKenna concludes his Macleans article 
with a gratuitous attack on the integrity of the 
late C.P. Stacey and S.F. Wise, two outstanding 
h i s to r i ans who have made impor t an t 
contributions to our knowledge of Canadian 
histoy. McKenna reports that in 1972 C.P. Stacey 
wrote to Syd Wise, his successor at the 
Directorate of History, suggesting that a report 
on "Spring," written by Guy Simonds, that was 
sharply critical of the Black Watch not be shown 
to Phil Griffin's brother who was seeking 
information about the circumstances of his 
brother's death. 
The story behind the Simonds report is 
worth recalling. When news of the heavy losses 
suffered by the Black Watch reached Canada the 
regimental seniors and friends demanded 
accounting. The Minister of National Defence, 
J.L. Ralston asked Stacey to carry out an 
investigation of "Spring" and efforts were made 
to interview survivors and ensure the relevant 
documents were preserved. Stacey provided the 
Minister with information about what happened 
but offered no adverse comments on anyone. 
Simonds paid little attention to this detailed 
examination of the evidence contenting himself 
with generalizations about the need to clear the 
start line. He also offered his much-quoted 
statement about "Spring" as a "holding attack" 
which Stacey and many other historians since 
used in explaining the purpose of the operation. 
The Simonds report tells us something about 
Guy Simonds but very little about "Spring." 
There was nothing new to be learned from it in 
1972 and it was not unreasonable for Stacey, 
who had preserved the document despite orders 
to destroy it, to advise Wise to maintain the 
confidential designat ion which kept the 
document from the public until a policy decision 
was made to open most records well before the 
standard 50 years had passed. Criticizing Wise 
is particularly ironic as he and his successor at 
the Directorate of History, Dr. Alec Douglas, were 
responsible for providing public access to 
National Defence records at the earliest possible 
date. When I first visited the Directorate in 1981 
the Simonds report as well as all the other 
documents on "Spring" were readily available 
thanks to the effort of these men. We all owe 
them an enormous debt and it is time McKenna 
apologized. 
Are there any lessons to be learned from the 
debate between McKenna and the research 
historians? In a recent CBC program, aired on 
their digital channel, McKenna noted that while 
the military and academic establishments 
criticized his work the media establishment 
always supported him and still does. McKenna 
remains CBC's favourite film maker as is evident 
from his current project on the Korean War. 
The CBC, the media establishment and Brian 
McKenna all believe that the story comes first, 
incidents that add drama second and the context 
a poor third. Information which contradicts or 
complicates the thrust of the narrative is to be 
ignored and words are used to convey emotion 
not precise meaning. In the face of such an 
approach all that historians can do is their job 
and that means challenging the myth-makers. 
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